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REDEFINING CRM
J. Norman Komich
The Aviation Connection
55 Middlebury Lane
Beverly, MA 01915
978-927-9566
Email: jnkomich@aol.com

The recent revision (120-51E, dated 1/22/04) to the Crew Resource Management Training Advisory Circular failed
to provide a specific definition of CRM. This void is an issue with those who agree with Montaigne when he
observed “No wind favors the sailing ship without a destined port.” Since its inception over twenty five years ago,
CRM has undergone considerable evolution and the industry now finds itself in the seventh or eighth “Generation”
of CRM training. Interestingly, in the very first Advisory Circular (120-51A) the following statement was made:
“The essence of CRM training is to reduce error in the cockpit.” In spite of that specific focus, during the last
quarter of a century, CRM training has been whatever the program developer wanted it to be and the result has
included such diverse subjects as Post Traumatic Stress, Security, Unruly Passengers, Scheduling Issues, and
Uniform Codes. The original definition of CRM as “The effective utilization of all available resources including
liveware, hardware and software, to achieve safe and efficient flight operations.” was a worthy “goal” which
unfortunately was more theoretical than practical; and no doubt contributed to why the current AC has no specific
definition. Safety and efficiency do not always go hand in hand and therein lies the rub. It is time the industry put
the practical side of the issue first and then back that up with theory. With that in mind, I make the observation that
the industry has failed abysmally to take advantage of the huge resource of line pilot experience. Line pilots who
achieves tens of thousands of hours accident and incident free has developed their own “bag of tricks” to stay out of
trouble. Academicians, management pilots, and even union members, do NOT adequately represent the line pilot.
With that in mind, I offer the following NEW and specific definition of CRM: “Cockpit Resource Management is
the comprehensive utilization of all available resources including people, equipment and procedures, to attempt to
get the job done correctly while staying out of trouble.” There are an infinite number of ways to do this and each
annual recurrent training should address some of those techniques. GAIN, ASAP, Line Pilot Reports, FAA
violations, Accident and Incident Reports, and the ASRS reporting system are all excellent starting point to gather
these techniques. Too much of that data is simply NOT making it to the cockpit. The industry must come to grips
with the fact that with each new technological improvement, each new aircraft design and each now operational
improvement, more challenges are being faced by the line pilot and CRM training is one way to aid the line pilot in
coping with these challenges. Consequently, CRM training remains a journey and NOT a destination.
REDEFINING CRM
The twenty fifth anniversary since the first
international workshop on CRM in 1979, recently
passed without much fanfare. What was the reason
for that lack of attention? Some might say it is a
result of the fact that the aviation industry has
adequately achieved what it set out to accomplish
twenty-five years ago. Such an attitude is reinforced
by the lack of specific CRM training that is taking
place today. On the other hand some might believe
that the lack of attention given to the passing of a
quarter century is because the industry has failed to
achieve ALL that it might have accomplished.
When one considers the vast amount of time, effort
and money that has gone into CRM training
during this period, it is not difficult to understand
why the industry is not celebrating such a lack of
success. These are two very contrasting and

contradictory points of view and they lay the
foundation for this paper.
Redefining CRM must begin with addressing the
need for a new definition. Why redefine CRM if the
old definition is adequate?? Put another way, “Does
the old definition suffice?”
To answer those
questions one must ask “What IS the old definition of
CRM?” Anyone with any experience in the field is
acutely familiar with the Mantra: “CRM is the
effective utilization of all available resources
including liveware, hardware, and software to
achieve safe and efficient flight operations.” That is
certainly a worthy goal; simultaneously achieving
safety and efficiency is the ultimate goal of ALL
flight operations regardless of the mission. Airlines,
military, corporate, air ambulances, off shore resupply, etc., have very different missions but they all
want to succeed in that mission and they all want to
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do so safely. No wonder the old definition has lasted
as long as it has. The theory is rock solid. So how is
the practical application?
To answer that question, one must ask how that
practical application will be evaluated?
One
approach is to simply poll attendees of CRM training
and ask if they feel safer than before the training.
Another is to compare accident statistics from before
and after CRM training. This author finds neither of
those approaches acceptable for the following
reasons. Self assessment is simply not objective
enough and statistics remain too similar to the bikini:
what they reveal is enticing but what they cover up is
vital. A low accident rate tells NOTHING of what is
routinely going on in the cockpit. Aside from the last
thirty minutes of the cockpit voice recorder in an
accident review, there are only two opportunities for
the industry to be exposed to how pilot’s function in
the cockpit during day to day operations.
One is observing flight crews in the simulator. This
author hates to rain on the parade of those who
promote the simulator as the panacea for most of the
aviation industry’s safety ills, but sadly, they are
kidding themselves and the industry. While the
simulator is an excellent tool for teaching procedures,
regardless of the amount of money spent on
improving the high technology of motion and visual
and regardless of the attempts to make LOFT (Line
Oriented flight Training) provide the atmosphere of
line operations, the fact remains that the pilot walks
into the simulator and he knows that. In the
simulator, one can NOT run out of gas, or be four
hours late, or be rushing to beat a curfew, or have
VIP’s on board, or be actually fatigued after 14 hours
on duty, or be hungry or whatever. Other
characteristics which decrease the effectiveness of
simulators include “glitches” in the software that
have the simulator NOT responding like the real
aircraft (negative G’s being one of the more obvious)
and the following war story in which the pilot was
right in the middle of his LOFT scenario in which he
had a key decision to make when the phone rang and
the instructor began dialogue with another instructor
as to where they were going out to eat that evening!
Acknowledging these facts will provide a key
cornerstone to understanding the efficacy (or lack
thereof) of the practical application of CRM.
The other opportunity to experience the how
practically CRM is being applied is through LOSA (
Line Oriented Safety Audit) in which fellow crew
members or researchers, ride along “just to observe”
and note any errors made by the crew. It is pre-briefed
that this audit will be “non-judgmental” and the crew

is to act as if “they weren’t there.” Anyone who
believes that the presence of an observer has NO
impact on how the flight crew functions is VERY
naïve. The Heisenberg theory empirically proved that
the presence of one body has a definite impact on the
movement of another body and nowhere is this truer
than in the cockpit. With that acknowledgment, the
other measurement of effectiveness of CRM is
similarly diluted and that leaves the following and
perhaps most legitimate gauge: line pilot observations.
NASA ASRS and ASAP reports provide only the tip
of the iceberg. Regardless of the wording in the ASR
and ASAP agreement, pilots are understandably not
going to divulge all the nuances of the event in these
reports. And how much is really learned from cursory
facts?? The next best thing to “being there” is
hearing about it “from the horses mouth. These
stories are never made public for obvious reasons but
any failure of the aviation industry to acknowledge
them does and will leave a large void in the safety
structure. And it is that void that precipitates the
need for redefining CRM.
The industry has been all too quick to celebrate its
successes and all too unwilling to acknowledge any
failure. It is extremely ironic to note that some of
those who are so quick to criticize a captain for not
accepting input from his other crew members, are
themselves too unwilling to accept any constructive
criticism from others. This author is not suggesting
that the industry has necessarily “failed” in its
attempt to teach CRM but he does suggest that much
more success might have been achieved; particularly
when one considers the vast resources applied to
CRM over the last twenty five years.
Having established the fact that while the theory of the
old definition was sound, its practical application has
been lacking, let us address another important reason
for redefining CRM. The old definition of CRM made
reference to “use of ALL available resources including
liveware, hardware and software” and yet for the first
sixteen years, all that was focused on was the
“liveware” part of the equation. Retired American
Airlines Captain, Bob Besco, pointed out that all that
was being addressed was “Small Group Dynamics”.
There was no emphasis on aviation specific issues, just
“how the crew got along.” This myopic focus lead to
the evolution of CRM from “Cockpit Resource
Management” to “Crew Resource Management.”
When the researchers ran out of interactive issues
between pilots, instead of addressing pilot-specific
issues such as situational awareness, or CFIT
(Controlled Flight Into Terrain) or Fuel Management,
etc., they simply expanded the size of the “team” and

411

focused on joint training with flight attendants,
dispatchers and maintenance personnel.
The philosopher Montaigne once observed that “No
wind favors the sailing ship without a destined port.”
When the industry ran out of interactive “team”
concepts, CRM training was indeed adrift at sea and
subject matter for CRM training took on any
appearance that the program developer desired. Post
Traumatic Stress Syndrome, Security, Unruly
Passengers, Scheduling Issues and Uniform
compliance took the place of legitimate aviation
safety issues. One glaring example of this lack of
focus was discussion of a flight crew that
encountered a severe wind shear that almost caused
the airplane to crash. The entire focus of the class
was on the after affects (PTSD) of the event on the
crew. After listening to the description of the affect
of the wind shear on the airframe, one pilot asked,
“What angle of bank did the aircraft achieve before
you were able to recover?” Not only was his
legitimate question NOT answered, the CRM
facilitator actually had the gall to declare “We will
NOT discuss ANY airplane specific issues here! We
are just discussing the success of the Critical Incident
Response!” The absurdity of such a statement defies
description. If only the industry would apply a
fraction of focus on avoiding the accident that it does
in intervening with the mishap crew, it would be in
far better shape. Without a clear focus on an accurate
definition of CRM, the industry will never achieve all
the success in avoiding accidents that it might.
PhD’s were brought on board at many carriers to
train these interactive skills but in some way, the
industry was actually doing a disservice to its pilots
by over emphasizing that as long as they “got along”
and “communicated”, they were safe. While good
interactive skills were “necessary” for a safe flight,
they were by no means “sufficient”. The American
Airlines accident at Cali was a glaring example that
CRM training required much more than small group
dynamics. The interactive skills of that particular
crew were fine; they just suffered from a classic loss
of situational awareness under high workload; one of
the many safety concepts ignored while focusing on
interactive training with other working groups.
The Cali crash resulted in significant backlash
towards CRM training. After much prodding, the
industry finally acknowledged that more than just
small group dynamics was needed. At a pilot meeting
at one of the major carriers, when the Chief Pilot
made the statement that “CRM is dead at XYZ” the
pilots cheered and gave him a standing ovation. At
another major carrier, the “Next Generation” of CRM

training was introduced with the statement “We are
going to drain the hot tub in CRM!” While this was
certainly a step in the right direction, acknowledging
what NOT to do was still not enough. In the very
first FAA Advisory Circular on CRM the following
statement was made. “The essence of CRM training
is to reduce error in the cockpit.” How should the
industry accomplish that goal? After sixteen years of
focusing almost exclusively on interactive skills to
reduce error, Cali glaringly pointed out that the
emperor has no clothes; and so sixteen years later, the
industry finally began to focus on what it had failed
to do so from the beginning.
While the intent was good, the result was abysmal.
The industry again refused to get into specific
aviation issues and instead came up with shallow
concepts such as the Volant Model which basically
advocates that “If you do everything right, you will
not do anything wrong”.
Malcom Armstrong,
Director of Safety for one of the major carriers,
succinctly shot holes in that model when he said
“Most people do not come to work intending to have
an accident. They are trying to do the right thing.
Flawed training, improper priorities, and defective
procedures are what lead to an accident.” The current
Threat and Error Management Model is yet another
generic attempt that fails to address specific aviation
safety issues. Likewise, the goal of “Avoid, manage
or mitigate the consequences of error” is yet another
theory that sounds great until one attempts a practical
application. I have asked many of its proponents for
a specific example of “mitigating the consequences
of an error” and I have yet to hear one legitimate one.
Why didn’t the aviation community as a whole ask
for such specific examples instead of blindly jumping
on the bandwagon?
All of this is water under the bridge. None of the
time, money, nor effort can ever be recaptured nor
can any of the accidents that have occurred during
that last twenty-five years be corrected. It is time for
the industry to change by design rather than just by
knee jerk reaction to yet more accidents and loss of
life. The definition being proposed here begins with
going back to the original concept of “Cockpit
Resource Management” since the cockpit and
aviation should be the focus of the training.
The new definition is given as “Cockpit Resource
Management is the comprehensive utilization of all
available resources including people, equipment and
procedures, to attempt to get the job done correctly
while staying out of trouble.” The emphasis on
“attempt” is the practical acknowledgement that
safety and efficiency do not always go hand in hand
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and sometimes, the job will not always get done.
Tenerife and Dryden have been held up as examples
of poor CRM in literally thousands of CRM classes.
What was the lesson learned from them? From the
“Old School” of CRM, the typical answer would be
poor communication can lead to an accident and the
flight attendants are the last bastion of safety. From
the “New School” of CRM the lesson learned would
be that “It is alright to cancel the flight. It is the
company’s responsibility to put up the passengers,
NOT the pilot’s.”

advantage of this wonderful resource of line pilot
experience. Furthermore, each new technological
advancement (GPS approaches) or new procedure
(Reduced Vertical Separation) brings more
challenges to the line pilot and these need to be
addressed right along with all the old standard
threats of CFIT and running out of gas. Every day
that these issues are not addressed is one day closer
to the next accident.

To put this point across, let me cite the following real
world war story from a typical CRM class at one of
the major air carriers with a CRM program held up as
“Providing the Leading Edge.” The class opens with
a series of pictures showing aircraft destroyed in
accidents. Then the following scenario is provided:
You are the First Officer on the flight and during the
originating flight pre-flight you discover some snow
on the wings. You report this to the captain who tells
you not to worry about it because it will blow off the
wing.
You attempt to express that you are
uncomfortable with that but the class facilitator keeps
telling you that the captain is not listening. The goal
of the class is obviously to see how many ways you
can tactfully challenge the captain’s decision. After a
couple dozen attempts to convince the captain his
decision is incorrect, one of your peers says “I’m
taking my flight bag and leaving the flight deck!”
The facilitator freaks out and begins babbling “No,
No, you can’t do that. You have to keep attempting
to convince the captain that his decision is incorrect.”
That attitude and curriculum have been the
foundation for CRM classes all over the world. That
approach is NOT always realistic nor always
practical; sometimes you just have to say NO and
that’s what separates the new CRM from the old.
Material for CRM classes should be addressing real
world issues and not just something that some
committee made up of members from various
working groups thought up during a working lunch
paid for by the company. Keep the focus on flying
and flying issues. GAIN, ASAP, Line Pilot Reports,
FAA violations, accident and incident reports, and
the ASRS reporting system are all excellent starting
points for poignant discussions. Analysis of what
was done wrong and right and what might be done
differently in the future provides an excellent forum
for pilots with tens of thousands oaf of accident free
flying hours to share all the tricks of the trade which
they have learned over the years to stay out of
trouble. Facilitators should have a definite theme for
the class and keep the focus of the discussion on that
theme. The industry has failed abysmally to take full
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